Coronavirus 2019-nCoV, able to enter and infect human cells’ ACE2 receptor via its spike protein.

The official story about Coronavirus 2019 nCoV is that it “appears to have originated in the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, a Chinese city about 650 miles south of Beijing that has a population of more than 11 million people.” This tale has been officially reported as early as January 9th by CCP’s state-owned and operated news channel, Xinhuanet, New-type coronavirus causes pneumonia in Wuhan: expert, reported by local Chinese authorities to the US National Library of Medicine database, Outbreak of Pneumonia of Unknown Etiology in Wuhan China: the Mystery and the Miracle and to the International Journal of Infectious Diseases database, The continuing 2019-nCoV epidemic threat of novel coronaviruses to global health — The latest 2019 novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, China.

Typically not included in most mainstream news stories, however, is the fact that the claimed epicenter of the outbreak is just 8.6 miles from Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses China’s only P4-Level Biosafety Laboratory capable of storing, studying, or engineering Pathogen Level 4 microbes such as other coronaviruses, Ebola, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, SARS, H5N1 influenza virus, Japanese encephalitis, and dengue. Bill Gurtz of the Washington Times reports, “the deadly animal virus epidemic spreading globally may have originated in a Wuhan laboratory linked to China’s covert biological weapons program, according to an Israeli biological warfare expert.” The journalist states that an unnamed U.S. official revealed that false rumors have been circulating for weeks on the Chinese Internet claiming the new coronavirus is “part of a U.S. conspiracy to spread germ weapons” — possibly preparing propaganda outlets to counter future charges the new virus escaped from one of Wuhan’s civilian or defense research laboratories.

The article refers to statements provided by Dany Shoham, a former Israeli military intelligence officer who holds a doctorate in medical microbiology, and served as a senior analyst with Israeli military intelligence for biological and chemical warfare in the Middle East and worldwide from 1970 to 1991.“Coronaviruses (particularly SARS) have been studied in the Institute and are probably held therein”, Shohan reveals, as has anthrax, adding that “certain laboratories in the Institute have probably been engaged, in terms of research and development, in Chinese [biological weapons]. Work on biological weapons is conducted as part of a dual civilian-military research and is “definitely covert.” Troublingly, even a State Department report issued last year raised suspicions that China has been engaged in covert biological warfare work. “Information indicates that the People’s Republic of China engaged during the reporting period in biological activities with potential dual-use applications, which raises concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC,” the report said, adding that the United States suspects China failed to eliminate its biological warfare program as required by the treaty.

Thus, it seems rather astute to examine the details of government- and media-disseminated reports in contrast to the background of activity conducted at Wuhan Institute of Virology, as well as look into the specifics of the new coronavirus in comparison with viruses already isolated, identified, stored, studied, and/or engineered at the Institute’s Biosafety Laboratory, in an effort to glean the truth.

Claims of surprise by Chinese scientists and State officials are arguably inauthentic

Let’s begin by examining the glaring discrepancies in the official story to the underlying and background reality of coronaviruses, especially in the SARS-scarred land of China. The Sun reports that the current consensus centers on the belief that the origin of the coronavirus outbreak is linked to bat soup sold at the market. However, the article states that experts “had thought the new virus wasn’t capable of causing an epidemic as serious as [previous deadly outbreaks of SARS and Ebola] because its genes were different,” something that simply isn’t true. In 2006, one of China’s preeminent virologists, Professor Zhengli Shi, co-authored the study, Review of Bats and SARSconcluding that “a SARS epidemic may recur in the future and that SARS-like coronaviruses (SL-CoVs) that originate from different reservoir host populations may lead to epidemics at different times or in different regions…. The recent discovery of a group of diverse SL-CoVs in bats support the possibility of these events….”


Bowl of hot, delicious bat soup served at Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, China.

A concurrent article published in the South China Morning Post on January 22, 2020, entitled Coronavirus weaker than SARS but may share link to bats, Chinese scientists say reports the latest findings on the coronavirus by scientists at China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention. “The scientists’ findings, published on Tuesday, suggested that the danger posed by the pneumonia-like virus may have been underestimated by the research community.” However, Prof. Zhengli and her co-authors published a study early last year on March 2, 2019 entitled Bat Coronaviruses in China which explicitly warned,

“During the past two decades, three zoonotic coronaviruses have been identified as the cause of large-scale disease outbreaks⁻Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and Swine Acute Diarrhea Syndrome (SADS). SARS and MERS emerged in 2003 and 2012, respectively, and caused a worldwide pandemic that claimed thousands of human lives, while SADS struck the swine industry in 2017. They have common characteristics, such as they are all highly pathogenic to humans or livestock, their agents originated from bats, and two of them originated in China. Thus, it is highly likely that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China. Therefore, the investigation of bat coronaviruses becomes an urgent issue for the detection of early warning signs, which in turn minimizes the impact of such future outbreaks in China” (emphasis added).

The South China Morning Post article continues with the beguiling assertion, “Previously, most scientists believed the new virus could not cause an epidemic as serious as that of SARS because its genes were quite different. But the new study found that, like SARS, the virus targeted a protein called angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2).” Apparently, the virology scientific community not only failed to heed Prof. Zhengli’s explicit, recent dire warnings about the “high likelihood” that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks would originate from bats — they also ignored Zhengli’s incredibly pertinent report published ten years ago in July, 2010, Identification of key amino acid residues required for horseshoe bat angiotensin-I converting enzyme 2 to function as a receptor for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus. The study’s abstract can’t be clearer on the immunological risks associated with protein ACE2, with its obvious liability for usurpation by viral agents with a little modified genome sequencing:

“Angiotensin-I converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) is the receptor for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus (SARS-CoV). A previous study indicated that ACE2 from a horseshoe bat, the host of a highly related SARS-like coronavirus, could not function as a receptor for SARS-CoV. Here, we demonstrate that a 3 aa change from SHE (aa 40–42) to FYQ was sufficient to convert the bat ACE2 into a fully functional receptor for SARS-CoV. We further demonstrate that an ACE2 molecule from a fruit bat, which contains the FYQ motif, was able to support SARS-CoV infection, indicating a potentially much wider host range for SARS-CoV-related viruses among different bat populations.”

This old but remarkable study concludes that only a minor genome sequence change was required to convert a non-susceptible bat ACE2 protein into a functional receptor for SARS-CoV, something that could easily happen in nature. “Considering that there are more than 60 different horseshoe [bat] species around the world (Flanders et al., 2009; Rossiter et al., 2007), it is possible that one or some of them may serve as the natural reservoir of SARS-CoV and/or its progenitor virus(es).” Why is it that current State virologists are apparently ignorant of these essential discoveries of yesteryear?

The South China Morning Post article cited above summarizes two primary known facts about the new coronavirus: first, that a “virus found in fruit bats is [the] common ancestor of the two strains [Coronavirus 2019-nCoV and SARS],” and that this “new strain has [an] unusually high ability to bind to a human protein.” And the new study on Coronavirus 2019-nCoV by the joint research team from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the People’s Liberation Army, and Institut Pasteur of Shanghai indeed found that, like SARS, the virus targeted the ACE2 protein. It’s just as Prof. Zhengli predicated a decade ago: “…the fact that an ACE2 protein from a megabat, the fruit bat Rousettus leschenaultia, can function as a receptor for SARS-CoV would suggest that the host range for SARS-CoV or SL-CoVs may be much wider than originally thought.”

So what happened — did the virology and surrounding scientific community drop the ball on these well-established findings and warnings, or what? After all, at least as February, 2008, they knew three key facts about ACE2:

  1. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is caused by the SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV), which uses ACE2 as its receptor for cell entry. SL-CoVs and SARS-CoVs share identical genome organizations and high sequence identities, with the main exception of the N terminus of the spike protein, known to be responsible for receptor binding in CoVs.
  2. Whereas the SL-CoV spike protein was unable to use any of the three ACE2 molecules as its receptor, and the SARS-CoV spike protein failed to center cells expressing the bat ACE2, the chimeric spike protein the study created did gain its ability to center cells via human ACE, and
  3. A minimal insert region (amino acids 310 to 518) was found to be sufficient to convert the SL-CoV S from non-ACE2 binding to human ACE2 binding, indicating that the SL-CoV S is largely compatible with SARS-CoV S protein both in structure and in function.

We know they knew these facts way back in 2008 because Prof. Zhengli published the findings of these facts in her report, Difference in Receptor Usage between Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Coronavirus and SARS-Like Coronavirus of Bat Origin. Therein the scientists concluded, “Knowing the capability of different CoVs to recombine both in the laboratory and in nature, the possibility that SL-CoVs may gain the ability to infect human cells by acquiring spike protein sequences competent for binding to ACE2 or other surface proteins of human cells can be readily envisaged.” Thus, it seems strange and perhaps even disingenuous that the new joint CCP government-joint Coronavirus 2019-nCoV task force is seemingly ignorant about coronavirus targeting the ACE2 protein, apparently pretending it’s only just now discovered this. After all, Zhengli’s 2008 report was quite clear about the role that this ACE2 protein would play in future pandemics: the study “strengthened our belief that ACE2 from certain bat species could be able to support SARS-CoV infection because of the predicted genetic diversity of bat ACE2 variants in different bat species.”

What is the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s National Biosafety Laboratory, where is it, and why is it pertinent?


Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, the only P4 lab in China, headquartered at Wuhan Institute of Virology.

At any rate, the forgoing storyline is the official word on Coronavirus 2019-nCoV, manifesting itself somehow in a seafood market in Wuhan. But what else might be found in Wuhan? After all, Wuhan is the capital city of the Hubei Province, home to some 11 million Chinese citizens. Well, curiously underreported is the fact that China’s first high-level biosafety laboratory is located just 8.6 miles away. “Used to study class four pathogens (P4), which refer to the most virulent viruses that pose a high risk of aerosol-transmitted person-to-person infections,” Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory is the darling, cutting-edge hi-tech baby of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and is the only such lab in China where dangerous, highly communicable viruses such as Ebola, SARS, MERS, H5N1 influenza virus, Japanese encephalitis, dengue, and assorted coronaviruses can be “safely” toyed with.


China’s National Biosafety Laboratory, located at Wuhan Institute of Virology, is only 8.6 miles away from the claimed epicenter of the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak. Do you believe in coincidences?

What’s odd is that despite completing the decade-long construction and having the official inauguration of this P4 laboratory on January 31, 2015 — announced by the General Office of Hubei Provincial People’s Government, it wasn’t until 2 and 1/2 years later in January 2018, that the Chinese government announced that the lab was actually in operation. And ahead of the lab’s second opening in January 2018, biosafety experts and scientists from the United States expressly warned “that a SARS-like virus could escape,” much in the same way the SARS virus had escaped multiple times from a lab in Beijing.

UPDATE — JANUARY 29, 2020: What’s also odd, and outright suspicious, is that as of January 29, 2020, the location of Wuhan Institute of Virology (where the National Biosafety Laboratory is headquartered) on Google Maps has inexplicably moved since I first viewed it on January 24, 2020 and published this article on January 27, 2020. Its new location is now over twice the distance from the claimed epicenter of the novel coronavirus, Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market. Even its satellite imagery of the original site has been altered as well. Good thing I took screenshots.


A Google Map Image captured Jan. 24, 2020 of Huanan Seafood market 8.6 miles distant from Wuhan Institute of Virology, where China’s only Level P4 Biosafety Laboratory is headquartered.

Another Google Map Image captured Jan. 29, 2020 displaying Wuhan Institute of Virology now strangely moved approximately 15 miles southwest of its original location. What a difference five days make, eh?

Side-by-side comparison of original Google Maps location of Wuhan Institute of Virology, captured by screenshot on Jan. 24, 2020, and its altered location as of Jan. 29, 2020. What’s going on here?

A Google Maps Satellite Image captured January 24, 2020, clearly showing the urban Wuhan Institute of Virology situated across the street from the humongous China Earthquake Administration building.

Another Google Maps Satellite Image captured January 29, 2020, now showing the Wuhan Institute of Virology completely camouflaged in a patch of forest in a rural area 15 miles southwest. What gives, Google?

Whether Wuhan Institute of Virology actually remains at its original location displayed a few days ago — or has suddenly packed up and is now holed up in the nearby woods like a crouching tiger or hidden dragon — former Israeli military intelligence officer and microbiologist, Dany Shoham, exposes the institute as “one of four Chinese laboratories engaged in some aspects of the biological weapons development.” He adds that although the institute is under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, it has certain laboratories within it that are linked to the Chinese defense establishment. Indeed, the annual State Department report on arms treaty compliance stated last year that China engaged in activities that could support biological warfare. In fact, in 1993, China declared a second facility, the Wuhan Institute of Biological Products — located 21.6 miles away from Wuhan Institute of Virology, and only 9 miles away from Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market — as one of eight biological warfare research facilities covered by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) which the communist country joined in 1985. “This means the SARS virus is held and propagated there, but it is not a new coronavirus, unless the wild type has been modified, which is not known and cannot be speculated at the moment,” Shoham explains.


Wuhan Institute of Biological Products — a known biological warfare research facility — is located just 9 miles from Wuhan Seafood Wholesale Market, the claimed epicenter of the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak

Wuhan Institute of Virology is also connected with the recent, major scandal in Canada where two Chinese virologists working at Canada’s only Pathogen Level 4 virology laboratory, the National Microbiology Lab (NML) in Winnipeg were caught stealing and smuggling some of the most deadly viruses on earth, including the Ebola virus, back to China. The suspects — a Chinese couple, virologist Dr. Xiangguo Qui and biologist Dr. Keding Cheng — are now believed to be connected to China’s biological warfare program. Her husband, Dr. Qiu, was head of the Vaccine Development and Antiviral Therapies Section in the Special Pathogens Program at the NML. Dr. Keding Cheng, also affiliated with the NML, specifically the “Science and Technology Core,” is primarily a bacteriologist who shifted to virology. According to ZeroHedge, “the couple is responsible for infiltrating Canada’s NML with many Chinese agents as students from a range of Chinese scientific facilities directly tied to China’s Biological Warfare Program, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Chengdu Military Region.

And guess what one of the stolen viruses was? Yup, coronavirus. On May 4, 2013, NML’s Scientific Director Frank Plummer received a shipment of coronavirus from a Dutch virologist, who in turn had received it from an Egyptian virologist treating a Saudi Arabian who contracted it. The Canadian lab grew stocks of the virus, and then experimented upon animals to see what they could infect with it. It is from this stash of reserves that the coronavirus was stolen and smuggled by Dr. Qui, Dr. Cheng, and by alledged Chinese Biological Warfare Program agents recruited from the Wuhan Institute of Virology who were disguised as virology students at the University of Manitoba.

Similarly, and perhaps connected, is the recent indictment of Charles Lieber, Chair of Harvard University’s Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology. Prosecutors claim he had a contract with Wuhan Institute of Virology. Reports CBS, “It appears China paid Lieber hundreds of thousands of dollars over the years for his involvement with the Chinese entities and for his work on research for Chinese gain,” said U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts Andrew Lelling.” Lieber lied about his links to Wuhan Institute of Virology, report Tonya Alanez and Travis Andersen of the Boston Globe. “Federal authorities said Charles Lieber, a prominent nanoscientist and a prolific inventor and entrepreneur, received hundreds of thousands of dollars from his Chinese connections.” Details about the extent of Lieber’s illicit and illegal conspiracy with the institute have yet to emerge. So this means, significantly, that not only are there Chinese nationals allegedly being recruited from Wuhan Institute of Virology to penetrate foreign P4 biosafety laboratories abroad and smuggle the spoils back home, but it also appears Americans and Canadians may be complicit in aiding the Chinese biowarfare program.

In short, although there are actually two laboratories in Wuhan linked to the Chinese biowarfare program — only one is certified for coronaviruses and only one is caught in the midst of all the recent international espionage intrigue — the new Pathogen Level 4-rated National Biosafety Laboratory at Wuhan Institute of Virology. And whether this enigmatic facility is a philanthropic, health services-related institute, a covert, biological warfare research installation, or some combination of the two — remains to be officially disclosed. So what on earth could the scientists sequestered at Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory have been up to in their brand new, state-of-the-art biotech base for two and a half years, if it wasn’t officially in operation? And what have they been doing since their second opening in 2018?


Scientists at Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory research coronaviruses, Ebola, and other deadly pathogens.

Well, storing, researching, and experimenting with numerous fulminant disease pathogens, of course. After all, the lab is “preservation center for virus seeds, a fulminant disease pathogen storage facility, a reference laboratory of WHO, a node for disease network, and finally…a core in China’s emerging disease research network.” Basically, in all of China, Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory is the only place to store and experiment with the most lethal, most virulent, most rapidly-spreading disease pathogens known to humanity. The lab is in “the central region of Central China, with mountains at three directions, convenient transportation and relatively independent environment” [sic]. And convenient it is, as you can play with Ebola, SARS, Hantavirus, and assorted coronaviruses in the morning…and then hop in your car and have some bat soup for lunch at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market on the other side of the Yangtze River. Maybe BYOB — bring your own bat?

Once Wuhan Institute of Virology formally put their brand new Cellular Level Biosafety Level 4 Laboratory into operation, we can safely take their word that they followed up on their promise to “conduct research for natural focal viruses including Ebola virus and other emerging viruses, such as researches [sic] on rapid detection system, molecular epidemiology, infectious disease etiology, therapeutic antibody, vaccine and drug evaluation, and assessment on biological risk factors, thus building a biosafety platform in China for emerging and fulminant infectious diseases in terms of isolation and identification of pathogen, building of infection models, vaccine development, biological containment and research on mechanism of interaction between pathogen and the host.” And one thing we know they worked on is the Origin and evolution of pathogenic coronaviruses, pioneered by none other than the enormously qualified, highly-decorated, and widely-respected Professor Zhengli Shi, Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator.

Who is Professor Zhengli Shi and what is her relevance to Wuhan Institute of Virology and the National Biosafety Laboratory?


Professor Zhengli Shi, Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator of Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory.

Do you believe in coincidences? Because it just so happens that Prof. Zhengli has been ardently researching and experimenting with coronaviruses for years at Wuhan Institute of Virology — even before ground was broken over a decade ago on the new P4 National Biosafety Laboratory. Interestingly, the scientist seems uniquely perfect for her role — like a “Neo” figure in a laboratory version of The Matrix. In fact, Prof. Zhengli has been Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator of Wuhan Insititute of Virology for the last 20 years, initially starting as a Research Assistant in 1990 before upgrading to Research Scientist in 1993, serving in that role until 1995. Aside from a 5-year leave from 1995 to 2000 to get her PhD at University of Montpellier in France, she’s been at the Institute for an amazing 30 years.

Notably, starting in 2014, Prof. Zhengli began to win particularly large sums of grant funding for the express purpose of researching and experimenting with coronaviruses — often receiving numerous, overlapping grants for the same time period. What’s just as interesting is where a lot of this funding originated — the US government. On January 6, 2014, Prof. Zhengli received a US$665,000 grant from the National Institute of Health for a study named The Ecology of Bat Coronaviruses and the Risk of Future Coronavirus Emergence (NIAID R01 AI1 10964) and then four days later on January 10, 2014, an additional US$559,500 grant from the United States Agency of International Development for research studied entitled Emerging Pandemic Threats PREDICT 2_China (Project No. AID-OAA-A-14–00102).

On top of these lucrative American grants she concurrently received similarly significant grants from the National Basic Research program of China, the Chinese Academy of Science, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and from the Strategic Priority Research Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences totaling over US$2,500,000 for researching interspecies transmission of zoonotic viruses, the identification, genetic evolution and pathogenesis of bat viruses, the genetic variation of pathogens in Africa, the evolution mechanism of the adaptation of bat SARS-related coronaviruses to host receptor molecules, the risk of interspecies infection, genetic evolution and transmission mechanism of important bat-borne viruses, and pathogen biology studies on novel swine coronaviruses.


In just the past five years alone, Prof. Zhengli Shi has almost US$10 million in grants to study coronaviruses.

We can quite safely conclude that when it comes to interspecies coronaviruses, Professor Zhengli Shi is a bona fide Jedi master. In fact, her Wikipedia page credits her and her colleague, Cui Jie, with the actual discovery that the SARS virus originated in bats. Her noted “Research Interests” on her C.V. include “Discovery of unknown viruses in wild animals especially bats, molecular epidemiology of emerging zoonotic viruses, and interspecies infection mechanism of zoonotic viruses.” Prof. Zhengli appears to be one of the world’s leading bat virologists — and most definitely the leading bat virologist in China. Indeed, her C.V. explicitly states,

“Prof. Zhengli Shi ’s researches focus on the molecular epidemiology and interspecies infection discovery and characterization of novel viruses in bats and other wildlife. She has gain [sic] rich expertise on pathogen biology of coronaviruses and other emerging viruses of bat origin, virus discovery, virus evolution, and development of diagnostic technologies for emerging viruses. Prof Shi has identified ultimately the animal origin of SARS, by discovering genetically diverse bat SARS related coronaviruses (SARSr CoV), isolating bat SARSr CoVs highly homologous to SARS CoV that are able to the same receptor [sic] as SARS CoV, and revealing the potential recombination origin of SARS CoV. She has discovered a large number of novel viruses from Chinese bat populations, including viruses with potential public health significance.”

Unsurprisingly, Prof. Zhengli has been featured as a key presenter at over two dozen international virology conferences, the latest being From SARS to SADS: predict of emerging infectious diseases, held at UC Berkeley in the summer of 2018. Her presentations at the next five most recent conferences all relate specifically to the genetic evolution and interspecies infection of bat coronaviruses. A complete list of Prof. Zhengli’s conference presentations may be found in Appendix B.


Nearly all of Prof. Zhengli’s recent conference presentations relate to bat coronaviruses. Do you believe in coincidences?

Prof. Zhengli has been or is currently a professional member of the Chinese Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (2000–2016), the Chinese Society for Microbiology (2002-present), the American Society for Microbiology (2007-present), and the Scientific Committee of the DIVERSITAS ecoHEALTH Core Project (2014–2016). She has served on the Editorial Board of Virologica Sinica (2016–2016), on the Editorial Board of Journal of Medical Virology (2015–2017), and on the Editorial Board of Virology (2017–2019). She was Associate Editor of Virology Journal (2016–2018), and Editor-in-Chief of Virologica Sinica (2017–2019). Prof. Zhengli is also the recipient of numerous, prestigious awards and honors, including the Natural Science Award of Hubei Province, China (First Prize and Second Prize), Outstanding Scientist of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Outstanding Research Article on Natural Science (Grand Prize and Second Prize).

OK, but how is Prof. Zhengli relevant to the current new outbreak of Coronavirus 2019-nCoV?


Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak in Wuhan, China — where the National Biosafety Laboratory is located — causes a massive quarantine of 11 million citizens.

Chinese scientists, researchers, and doctors examining the emergent 2019-nCoV Coronavirus report that the new viral menace appears to be “a recombinant virus between the bat coronavirus and an origin-unknown coronavirus. The recombination occurred within the viral spike glycoprotein, which recognizes cell surface receptor.” But Prof. Zhengli appears to have worked with recombinant Coronavirus derivations involving viral spike proteins for over a decade at Wuhan Institute of Virology, all the way back to 2006 and up to as recently as December, 2019 — the very month that 2019-nCoV Coronavirus was first reported as having infected visitors at Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market just down the road from her laboratory!


The day before the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak, this report was published. Do you believe in coincidences?

In fact, on the day before the new coronavirus would find its first victims just 8.6 miles away at the market on December 12, 2019, Prof. Zhengli and her team published the study entitled Molecular mechanism for antibody-dependent enhancement of coronavirus entry on December 11, 2019. The abstract reads,

“Coronavirus spike protein mediates viral entry into cells by first binding to a receptor on host cell surface and then fusing viral and host membranes. Our study reveals a novel molecular mechanism for antibody-enhanced viral entry and can guide future vaccination and antiviral strategies. This study reveals complex roles of antibodies in viral entry and can guide future vaccine design and antibody-based drug therapy.”

And immediately after this study was published — literally the following day — the first victims became infected with what would soon be named Coronavirus 2019-nCoV began to get infected…just a few miles away from Prof. Zhengli’s laboratory. And as The Sun reports, victims of the new coronavirus are infected via a strong binding affinity to a human protein called ACE2,” in precisely the identical manner as Prof. Zhengli’s just-discovered “novel molecular mechanism” identified (or engineered) literally weeks if not days before. Do you believe in coincidences?

Let’s say that’s just a coincidence Prof. Zhengli published a study or two specifically on bat coronaviruses. Have there been others?

How much time you got? The above study, specifically relating to human host cell binding and entry of coronavirus infection, and published the day before the first viral infections were reported at a location adjacent Prof. Zhengli’s laboratory, is far from the only study in which she has directed on the subject. The scientist’s entire virology history is rife with hands-on experience with coronaviruses, with especial attention devoted to understanding their spike protein properties, as related to potentiality of human cell entry and infection. In June 2016’s study, Bat Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Like Coronavirus WIV1 Encodes an Extra Accessory Protein, ORFX, Involved in Modulation of the Host Immune Response she writes that what was important was that bats “harbor genetically diverse SARS-like coronaviruses (SL-CoVs), and some of them have the potential for interspecies transmission.” She further states that her team created a “reverse genetics system” that would be helpful for “study of the pathogenesis of this group of viruses and to develop therapeutics for future control of emerging SARS-like infections.”

In a letter to the editor of SCIENCE CHINA Life Sciences published in November, 2017, entitled Cross-neutralization of SARS coronavirus-specific antibodies against bat SARS-like coronaviruses, Prof. Zhengli warns that severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) is considered to be an emerging zoonotic pathogen crossing species barriers to infect humans, and that the spike protein of the virus’ RNA genome plays a key role in human cellular entry.

In that same month, the results of a study Prof. Zhengli conducted, Serological evidence of bat SARS-related coronavirus infection in humans, China indicated that some SARSr-CoVs may have high potential to infect human cells, without the necessity for an intermediate host.

In 2016, one of the Directors at Wuhan Institute of Virology posted the annual Director’s Message, of which the following finding was the top announcement: “The live SARS-like coronavirus SL-CoV-WIV1 has been isolated for the first time from the bat droppings; and such virus has been confirmed to invade the host cells through the ACE2 of human beings, civets and Rhinolophus sinicus. The research result has so far provided the most convincing evidence to the view that Rhinolophus sinicus is the natural host of SARS-CoV (Nature, 2013).” Does this not sound precisely like Coronavirus 2019-nCoV, which invades the host cells through the ACE2 protein? At any rate, since Prof. Zhengli is Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator of both the Emerging Viruses Group and the National Biosafety Laboratory, this is squarely her turf; the current outbreak seems amazingly similar.

In a study conducted in September of 2015, Two Mutations Were Critical for Bat-to-Human Transmission of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus, Prof. Zhengli and team successfully achieved viral entry (bat-to-human transmission)of bat coronavirus HKU4 via its spike protein by performing two small mutations. Doing so also helped explain how MERS coronavirus was able to infect humans as well.

It was in 2015’s study, Isolation and Characterization of a Novel Bat Coronavirus Closely Related to the Direct Progenitor of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus that Prof. Zhengli and team highlighted “the likelihood of future bat coronavirus emergence in humans” by isolating a new bat coronavirus closer to SARS-CoV in genomic sequence, particularly in its spike gene. “Cell entry and susceptibility studies indicated that this virus can…infect animal and human cell lines,” they concluded.

And in 2010’s Angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) proteins of different bat species confer variable susceptibility to SARS-CoV entry Prof Zhengli and her team of scientists “extended [their] previous study to ACE2 molecules from seven additional bat species and tested their interactions with human SARS-CoV spike protein using both HIV-based pseudotype and live SARS-CoV infection assays.”

Even earlier in 2010, Prof. Zhengli published, Bat and virus, a keystone study identifying bats “as a natural reservoir of emerging and reemerging infectious pathogens,” emphasizing that an astonishing amount (more than 70, at the time) and genetic diversity of viruses isolated from the bat have been identified in different populations throughout the world. She stresses that many viruses were found in apparently healthy bats, suggesting that bats may have a particularly robust immune system or “antiviral activity against virus infections.”

In 2009’s Immunogenicity difference between the SARS coronavirus and the bat SARS-like coronavirus spike (S) proteins, Prof. Zhengli and her team concluded “SARS-like coronavirus (SL-CoV) in bats have a similar genomic organization to the human SARS-CoV.” And notably, that this work “provides useful information for future development of differential serologic diagnosis and vaccines for coronaviruses with different S [spike] protein sequences.”

Prof. Zhengli’s research in 2009’s Differential stepwise evolution of SARS coronavirus functional proteins in different host species produced results that supported the hypothesis that “SARS-CoV originated from bats and that the spill over into civets and humans were more recent events.”

Moving even further back in time to 2007, Prof. Zhengli worked on Determination and application of immunodominant regions of SARS coronavirus spike and nucleocapsid proteins recognized by sera from different animal species, producing assays that would be a “useful tool to trace the origin and transmission of SARS-CoV and to minimise the risk of animal-to-human transmission.”

It appears that 2006 was the year Prof. Zhengli first researched recombinant spike proteins along with other distinctive genome sequences resulting from the interaction of bat, palm civet, and human isolates. “Full-length genome sequences of two SARS-like coronaviruses in horseshoe bats and genetic variation analysis.” Basically, she is tremendously versatile and adept in her research whenever she encounters these recombinant spikes proteins in viral interactions.

Moreover, it’s not just coronaviruses from bats that she and her team have discovered and explored, but also diverse novel viruses/virus antibodies in bats, including adenoviruses, adeno-associated viruses, circoviruses, paramyxoviruses, and filoviruses. In fact, Prof. Zhengli has coauthored over an astounding 130 publications on viral pathogen identification, diagnosis and epidemiology — nearly all of which commandeered at Wuhan Institute of Virology where the National Biosafety Laboratory is located and where she reigns as Head of the Department. In fact, on the World Society for Virology website, Prof. Zhengli’s profile confirms that one of her great contributions was to “uncover genetically diverse SARS-like coronaviruses in bats with her international collaborators and provide unequivocal evidence that bats are natural reservoirs of SARS-CoV.” Thus, her adeptness in the specialized field of bat virology — especially where transmission to humans is concerned — is inarguable.

Such an expansive personal history of expertise into coronaviruses is not only impressive, but unique, and the bulk of her 30-year career at Wuhan Institute Virology seems to have been dedicated primarily to the examination and exploration of all facets of interspecies (though primarily bat) pathogenic infection of coronaviruses into human host cells. For reference, you can check Appendix A for the sum total of all her published (or otherwise unclassified or declassified) studies at the end of this essay. Prof. Zhengli’s absolute mastery of bat-to-human transmission of viruses via their spike protein binding with human cell receptors is virtually conclusive and unrivalled.

Unanswered Questions About the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV Outbreak in Wuhan

In Prof. Zhengli’s March 2019 study, Bat Coronaviruses in China, she proves seemingly prophetic, writing that it was “highly likely that future SARS- or MERS-like coronavirus outbreaks will originate from bats, and there is an increased probability that this will occur in China. Therefore, the investigation of bat coronaviruses becomes an urgent issue for the detection of early warning signs, which in turn minimizes the impact of such future outbreaks in China.” Just nine months later, 2019-nCoV rears its viral head, less than 10 miles from her labatory: how did Prof. Zhengli know?

The Sun cited a report voicing warnings given back in 2017 “that a deadly SARS-like virus could escape from lab [sic] in Wuhan set up to study some of the world’s deadliest diseases.” The worries surrounding Wuhan’s laboratory surfaced almost an entire year before the Chinese government announced its official commencement of operation in January, 2018. And likely with good cause, as the “SARS virus [had] escaped from high-level containment facilities in Beijing multiple times, notes Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey.” However, the article in The Sun exaggerates the distance from Wuhan’s National Biosafety Laboratory to Huanan Market, erroneously claiming that it’s 20 miles away, instead of 8.6 miles, and also states that Dr. Ebright reportedly said “at this point there’s no reason to harbor suspicious that the facility had anything to do with the outbreak.” Seriously? Does Dr. Ebright believe in coincidences?

Another new article from The Sun published January 23, 2020, reports a “new study was carried out jointly by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the People’s Liberation Army and Institut Pasteur of Shanghai, revealing that the coronavirus has a strong binding affinity to a human protein called ACE2.” But Zhengli and her team mates have been aware of the susceptibility of ACE2 to SARS and coronavirus infection for at least the last ten years, publishing their studies with the US National Library of Medicine and with other prominent industry repositories.

So we are left with the following pressing, unanswered questions about Prof. Zhengli, the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, and the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak in Wuhan:

  1. Why are the Chinese authorities seemingly ignoring the Wuhan Institute Virology’s contemporaneous coronavirus study (culminating in a Dec. 11, 2019 report, published the day before the outbreak) conducted at the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, located just 8.6 miles distant from the claimed epicenter of pandemic origin, Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market? Why is the media not reporting this?
  2. Why are most media reports covering the coronavirus still misreporting the source of the virus’ genome sequence as snakes instead of bats?
  3. Since the Wuhan Institute of Virology has already isolated live, novel SARS-like Coronavirus SL-CoV-WIV1 from bat droppings in 2016, and such virus has been confirmed to invade the host cells through the ACE2 of human beings just like the new, emergent Coronavirus 2019-nCoV — have the two coronaviruses been compared with each other? Was there a vaccine developed from Coronavirus SL-CoV-WIV1 that can be tested on victims of the latest outbreak? After all, it’s been about four years now.
  4. Has any formal investigation been launched into any role the Wuhan Institute of Virology (and specifically, its Classification P4 Biosafety Laboratory) may have played in the pandemic outbreak?
  5. Did the new coronavirus penetrate the biosecurity measures of Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory? Did some bats mount a successful escape?
  6. Did any scientists, researchers, professors, observers, students, or other staff persons working at or visiting the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory visit the Huanan Seafood Market in the first twelve days of December, 2019?
  7. Since the original technology for viral confinement at the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory was developed in France, and since most of its actual, functional equipment was imported from France — has the laboratory received ongoing certification inspections from French officials, given its lengthy, ongoing activities using Class 4 pathogens (P4) — the most virulent viruses that pose the highest risk of aerosol-transmitted person-to-person infections? If so, where are the certification test results?
  8. Has the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory been regularly inspected and audited by Chinese government health officials, especially by Li Bin, minister of the National Health and Family Planning Commission? If so, where are the inspection and audit results?
  9. Could there have been either a staff person or visitor who smuggled out the coronavirus from the laboratory? (After all, a Chinese national was just arrested at Harvard University for attempting to smuggle research vials back to China at the same time when the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak started.)
  10. At any time did Prof. Zhengli Shi — who simultaneously currently holds the multiple titles of Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator, Director of the Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases, Director of BSL-3 Labatory, Director of the Committee of Biosafety, Director of Chinese Academy Sciences (CAS) Key Laboratory of Special Pathogens and Biosafety, and Vice Director of BSL-4 Laboratory at Wuhan Institute of Virology, CAS — ever work directly or indirectly for the CCP military services or military intelligence community?
  11. Did Prof. Zhengli previously or does she currently co-conduct, coparticipate, collaborate, or collude with CCP military service members or military intelligence members?
  12. Do members of the CCP military services or military intelligence contribute or participate in any manner or conduct viral research at the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory?
  13. Did Prof. Zhengli or any other faculty member at the Wuhan Institute of Virology take possession, either illicitly or officially, of any biological substance, whether pathogen, vaccine, or other biomatter, originating from the United States or Canada?
  14. Why did the US National Institute of Health (NIH) grant Prof. Zhengli $665,000 in 2014 to fund her study, The ecology of bat coronaviruses and the risk of future coronavirus emergence? What did the US receive in return?
  15. Why did the United States Agency of International Development grant Prof. Zhengli $559,500 to fund her study, Emerging Pandemic Threats PREDICT 2_China? What did the US receive in return?
  16. Why did Prof. Zhengli receive funding from U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (the agency which deals specifically with Weapons of Mass Destruction), the U.S. Biological Defense Research Directorate of the Naval Medical Research Center, and the Department of Atomic of the Government of India?
  17. What other professional relationships with U.S. defense agencies does Prof. Zhengli have currently, or previously, in any capacity?
  18. When Prof. Zhengli received a visa to the United States to present at the Cell Symposium: Emerging and Re-emerging Viruses 2017 conference in Arlington, Virginia, did she visit the Pentagon or meet with Pentagon officials, since it was less than a mile away?
  19. When Prof. Zhengli received a visa to the United States to present at the US-China Workshop on Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases conference at UC Berkeley in 2018, did she visit Federal research facility, Lawrence-Berkeley-Livermore Laboratory — in particular, the Department of Energy’s Joint Genome Institute — or meet with government officials, since it was only a mile and a half away?
  20. Prof. Zhengli’s C.V. indicates she received a visa to the United States to present at the U.S.-China Dialogue on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety and Global Health Security conference on January 17, 2018, in Galveston, Texas. However, such a conference appears to not have existed. For what purpose did she really come to Galveston — perhaps to visit the Galveston National Laboratory, a high security National Biocontainment Laboratory housing several Biosafety Level 4 research laboratories, one of the only 15 biosecurity Level 4 facilities in the United States and the largest one in the world located on an academic campus? Was this apparently imaginary conference merely a ruse for a surreptitious rendezvous?
  21. Of Prof. Zhengli’s 130 published scientific studies, 5 of them are not to be found anywhere. Why are they not public? Are they classified?
  22. Has Prof. Zhengli (or any other staff, resident or guest scientists, researchers, students, visitors, or others) at the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory, or at Wuhan Institute of Virology in general, collaborated, participated with, colluded with, or in any way professionally acted in concert or collusion with, or in any way worked with or for, the World Economic Forum, the U.S. Center for Disease Control, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Pilbright Institute, the European Commission, the World Health Organization, the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, or the John Hopkins Center for Health Security?
  23. Prof. Zhengli recently (January 23, 2020) claimed to know very little about the latest epidemic outbreak, including basic biology, animal source, or any specific treatment, and indicated she doesn’t know if ACE2 targeting drugs could treat Coronavirus 2019-nCoV infected victims. How can this be the case, given that she has studied human ACE2/coronavirus interaction for many years — even most recently in her study immediately preceding the outbreak — as reported in Prof. Zhengli’s study published the day immediately preceding the outbreak? “The full-length genes of MERS-CoV spike (GenBank accession number 415 AFS88936.1), SARS-CoV spike (GenBank accession number AFR58742), human DPP4 416 (GenBank accession number NM_001935.3) and human ACE2 (GenBank accession 417 number NM_021804) were synthesized (GenScript Biotech).”
  24. Considering Prof. Zhengli is the recipient of millions of dollars in grants and salaries, commands one of the world’s leading, most advanced biosafety laboratories, has performed innumerable research studies into coronaviruses for three decades and counting — what vaccines, to date, has she successfully produced? Has she produced any successful coronavirus vaccines at all? If so, where are they and how have they been publicly administered?

Summary, conclusion, and just a wee bit of speculation

The facts presented herein compel an alternative theory as to the origin of the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak. The truth remains to be formally investigated whether infected viral bio-matter from the National Biosafety Laboratory at Wuhan Institute of Virology — the only lab of its kind in all of China and under expressed safety concerns for almost a year — somehow escaped. And, if so, it also remains to be seen whether such a viral release and subsequent viral infection was accidental or intentional. In any event, the following observations and concerns seem to place considerable suspicion on the laboratory — and its Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator, Prof. Zhengli Shi — and its contemporaneous coronavirus research activity at the exact time of the Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak officially reported at a location conveniently just 8.6 miles distant at Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, just across the Yangtze River:

  1. The National Biosafety Laboratory at Wuhan Institute of Virology is the only high-level P4 facility of its kind in all of China, literally the only place where high contagious and infectious pathogens and diseases such as Ebola, SARS, MERS, and assorted coronaviruses can be “safely” studied, mutated, and engineered.
  2. The professional background, experience, and qualifications of the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory’s Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator — Professor Zhengli Shi — is nonpareil. She has commandeered, produced and/or co-authored over 130 scientific studies, including dozens of reports specifically on coronaviruses. So specialized and talented is she that the even the United States has granted her over $1 million for her research conducted in China.
  3. It cannot be overstated the importance and implication of the short distance between the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory and the reported epicenter of Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak — the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market — of only 8.6 miles. With a total area of 3.8 million square miles, and a breadth of about 3,000 miles, these two locations are relatively-speaking right next to each other. Even before the lab’s government-announced formal operational opening, American scientists and biosafety experts had expressed their concerns for the laboratory, especially its proximity to the relatively large population of Wuhan, capital city of Hubei province.
  4. At the time of the new coronavirus outbreak, or immediately preceding it, Prof. Zhengli was actively conducting coronavirus experiments and research at the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory. Notably, the very next day following the publishing of her coronavirus study on December 11, 2019, the first victims of Coronavirus 2019-nCoV were reported, as confessed by Prof. Zhengli herself in her most recent, latest report, posted online on January 23, 2020: “The epidemic, started from December 12th, 2019, has caused 198 laboratory confirmed infections with three fatal cases by January 20th, 2020.”
  5. Most alarming is the apparent, glaring disingenuousness of Prof. Zhengli’s latest report, which is the only public statement since the official Chinese acknowledgement of Coronavirus 2019-nCoV outbreak in Wuhan. On January 23, 2020, she published the report with the allegedly misleading statements:

“Finally, based on our results, it should be expected and worth to test if ACE2 targeting or SARS-CoV targeting drugs can be used for nCoV-2019 patients. At this stage, we know very little about the virus, including basic biology, animal source or any specific treatment. The almost identical sequences of this virus in different patients imply a probably recent introduction in humans, thus future surveillance on viral mutation and transmission ability and further global research attention are urgently needed.”

However, other Chinese scientists reported on January 22, 2020, “Results obtained from our analyses suggest that the 2019-nCoV appears to be a recombinant virus between the bat coronavirus and an origin-unknown coronavirus. The recombination occurred within the viral spike glycoprotein, which recognizes cell surface receptor.” Our findings suggest “that homologous recombination within the spike glycoprotein may contribute to cross-species transmission.” Although this other scientific team incorrectly attributes the originating species as reptilian (snake) instead of bats, they at least rapidly identified the coronavirus as a recombinant virus with one of the contributors being a bat coronavirus, and also discerned in what manner the genetic recombination occurred to allow for human infection: in a viral spike protein which recognized the cell surface receptor. But as shown previously, this precise area of coronavirus study involving spike protein and cell surface receptor was the focus of Prof. Zhengli’s contemporaneous December 2019 study published the day before the epidemic started. “Coronavirus spike protein mediates viral entry into cells by first binding to a receptor on host cell surface and then fusing viral and host membranes,” she wrote. Why would she feign ignorance about this?

Even more concerning, on October 31, 2019, Prof. Zhengli had published a report entitled Filovirus-reactive antibodies in humans and bats in Northeast India imply zoonotic spillover, curiously funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the U.S. Biological Defense Research Directorate of the Naval Medical Research Center, and the Department of Atomic Energy of the Government of India, and edited by a microbiologist employed by the U.S. Center for Disease Control.


U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency? Can viruses from bats be used as weapons of mass destruction?

Of note is the fact that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is an agency within the U.S. Department of Defense and is the official Combat Support Agency for countering weapons of mass destructionWhy would they be funding this project? Could it be that these coronaviruses with filovirus reactive antibodies are being weaponised? Are they really that dangerous? Could they actually be employed as a weapon of mass destruction? Well, let’s a take a look at what Prof. Zhengli was studying, filovirus surface glycoproteins:

Bats are reservoirs for several zoonotic pathogens, including filoviruses. High risk activities at the bat-human interface pose the threat of zoonotic virus transmission. We present evidence for prior exposure of bat harvesters and two resident fruit bat species to filovirus surface glycoproteins. Our results indicate circulation of several filoviruses in bats and the possibility for filovirus transmission from bats to humans. Filoviruses, including ebolaviruses and marburgviruses, are pathogens with epidemic potential. They were previously detected in bats and have caused disease outbreaks in humans with a high case fatality rate. Our findings suggest bats in South Asia act as a reservoir host of a diverse range of filoviruses and filovirus spillover occurs through human exposure to these bats.

Thus, it’s readily apparent that just from this single project that Prof. Zhengli was quite aware that pathogenic viruses from bats could transmit from bats to humans via filovirus surface glycoproteins, with potentially epidemic consequences. Could our brilliant, pioneering, decorated Senior Scientist and Principal Investigator of the only Level P4 Biosafety Laboratory in China be feigning ignorance presently to deflect discovery of her connections to four major defense agencies and her possible stewardship of a brand-new bioactive weapon of mass destruction? At this point, only speculation is possible…but if we’re going to speculate, let’s take one step more, shall we?

Could there be a another study previously spearheaded by Prof. Zhengli whose findings may have attracted multiple American defense departments for such a project with epidemic potential? Perhaps we can find the answer in the study, Discovery of Novel Bat Coronaviruses in South China That Use the Same Receptor as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus, a seemingly important and relevant 2018 project where Prof. Zhengli provided evidence of a Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) “derived from the great evening bat that uses the same host receptor as human MERS-CoV. This virus also provides evidence for a natural recombination event between the bat MERS-related CoV and another bat coronavirus, HKU4” (emphasis added). The purpose of this study was “the prevention and control of the spread of MERS-CoV to humans.” It pertains precisely to the implications presented by the current Coronavirus 2019-nCoV, which were identified by the other group of Chinese scientists as a bat-involved, recombinant virus with a viral spike protein, recognizing cell surface receptor and so able to infect human cells.

And yet another highly relevant study with the potential to capture the attention of biowarfare officials in United States defense departments is Discovery of a Rich Gene Pool of Bat SARS-related Coronaviruses Provides New Insights Into the Origin of SARS Coronavirus, published in November 2017, where Prof. Zhengli and her colleagues conducted cell entry studies which “demonstrated that three newly identified SARSr-CoVs [SARS-related coronaviruses] with different [spike] protein sequences are all able to use human ACE2 as the receptor, further exhibiting the close relationship between strains in this cave and SARS-CoV. This work provides new insights into the origin and evolution of SARS-CoV and highlights the necessity of preparedness for future emergence of SARS-like diseases” (emphasis added).

All of the studies cited here appear related and interconnected, and considering the involvement of American defense agencies — in particular, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency which deals exclusively with matters pertaining to weapons of mass destruction and threat networks — there seems ample reason to be gravely concerned. And that concern remains whether there’s reason to suspect coronaviruses could be used by others as bioweapons of mass destruction, or that rogue, Deep State operatives within our own defense departments — colluding with Communists — are developing or have already developed a bioweapon of mass destruction.

In conclusion, though admittedly much investigation remains to be performed (especially into the numerous unanswered questions posed in this essay), it seems the likeliest source of origin for Coronavirus 2019-nCoV is the Wuhan National Biosafety Laboratory at the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Further, it appears to me that, at best, there may be concerted efforts to conceal the precise nature of the virus, its source, and the parties responsible, or that, at worst, the dissemination of the epidemic coronavirus is intentional. Could the actual RNA genome source, sequencing and recombination of the coronavirus already be known, and could its vaccine have already been developed? Could it already be patented? Essentially, is this latest global pandemic threat a Communist cover-up, or a pandemic bioweapon of mass destruction developed by the global Deep State?

Appendix A: Professor Zhengli Shi’s published scientific papers

1. Zhou, P., # Fan, H., # Lan, T., # Yang, X-L, Shi, W-F, Zhang, W., Zhu. Y., Zhang, Y-W., Xie, Q-M., Mani, S., Zheng, X-S., Li, B., Li, J-M., Guo, H., Pei, G-Q., An, X-P., Chen J-W., Zhou, L., Mai, K-J., Wu, Z-X., Li, D., Anderson, D.E., Zhang, L-B., Li, S-Y., Mi, Z-Q., He, T-T., Cong, F., Guo, P-J., Huang, R., Luo, Y., Liu, X-L., Chen, J., Huang, Y., Sun, Q., Zhang, X-L-L., Wang, Y-Y., Xing, S-Z., Chen, Y-S., Sun, Y., Li, J., Daszak, P.*, Wang, L-F.*, Shi, Z-L.*, Tong, Y-G.*, Ma, J-Y.* (2018). Fatal swine acute diarrhoea syndrome caused by an HKU2-related coronavirus of bat origin. Nature, 556 (7700): 255–258.

2. Xie, J.Z., Li, Y., Shen, X., Goh, G., Zhu, Y., Wang, L-F., Cui, J., Shi, Z-L.,* Zhou, P.* (2018). Dampened STING-dependent interferon activation in bats. Cell Host Microbe, 23(3): 297–301 e4.

3. Li, W., Wang, B., Li, B., Zhang, W., Zhu, Y., Shi, Z. L. & Yang, X. L*. (2018). Genomic Characterization of a novel hepatovirus from great roundleaf bats in China. Virol Sin 33 (1), 108–110.

4. Luo, C. M., Wang, N., Yang, X. L., Liu, H. Z., Zhang, W., Li, B., Hu, B., Peng, C., Geng, Q. B., Zhu, G. J., Li, F*. & Shi, Z. L*(2018). Discovery of novel bat coronaviruses in South China that use the same receptor as Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. J Virol 92 (13). 10.1128/JVI.00116–18.

5. Luo, Y., Li, B., Jiang, R. D., Hu, B. J., Luo, D. S., Zhu, G. J., Hu, B., Liu, H. Z., Zhang, Y. Z., Yang, X. L. & Shi, Z. L*. (2018). Longitudinal surveillance of betacoronaviruses in fruit bats in Yunnan province, China during 2009–2016. Virol Sin 33 (1), 87–95.

6. Wang, B., Li, W., Zhou, J. H., Li, B., Zhang, W., Yang, W. H., Pan, H., Wang, L. X., Bock, C. T., Shi, Z. L., Zhang, Y. Z*. & Yang, X. L*. (2018). Chevrier’s field mouse (Apodemus chevrieri) and Pere David’s vole (Eothenomys melanogaster) in China carry orthohepeviruses that form two putative novel genotypes within the species orthohepevirus C. Virol Sin 33 (1), 44–58.

7. Wang, N., Li, S. Y., Yang, X. L., Huang, H. M., Zhang, Y. J., Guo, H., Luo, C. M., Miller, M., Zhu, G., Chmura, A. A., Hagan, E., Zhou, J. H., Zhang, Y. Z., Wang, L. F., Daszak, P. & Shi, Z. L*(2018). Serological evidence of bat SARS-related coronavirus infection in humans, China. Virol Sin 33 (1), 104–107.

8. Hu, B., Zeng, L.P., Yang, X.L., Ge, X.Y., Zhang, W., Li, B., Xie, J.Z., Shen, X.R., Zhang, Y.Z., Wang, N., Luo, D.S., Zheng, X.S., Wang, M.N., Daszak, P., Wang, L.F., Cui, J.*, Shi, Z.L*. (2017). Discovery of a rich gene pool of bat SARS-related coronaviruses provides new insights into the origin of SARS coronavirus. PloS Pathogens 13(11): e1006698.

9. Waruhiu, C#., Ommeh, S#., Obanda, V., Agwanda, B., Gakuya, F., Ge, X. Y., Yang, X. L., Wu, L. J., Zohaib, A., Hu, B. & Shi, Z. L*(2017). Molecular detection of viruses in Kenyan bats and discovery of novel astroviruses, caliciviruses and rotaviruses. Virol Sin. 32 (2), 101–114.

10. Zhang, Q., Zeng, L.P., Zhou, P., Irving, A.T., Li, S., Shi, Z.L.*, Wang, L.F. (2017). IFNAR2-dependent gene expression profile induced by IFN-α in Pteropus alecto bat cells and impact of IFNAR2 knockout on virus infection. PloS One. 12(8):e0182866.

11. Wang, B., Cai, C.L, Li, B., Zhang, W., Zhu, Y., Chen, W.H., Zhuo, F., Shi, Z.L., Yang,

X.L.* (2017). Detection and characterization of three zoonotic viruses in wild rodents and shrews from Shenzhen city, China. Virol Sin. 32(4):290–297.

12. Zeng, L.P., Ge, X.Y., Peng, C., Tai, W.B., Jiang, S.B., Du, L.Y.*, Shi, Z.L.* (2017). Cross-neutralization of SARS coronavirus-specific antibodies against bat SARS-like coronaviruses. Sci China Life Sci. 60(12):1399–1402.

13. Wang, B., Yang, X. L., Li, W., Zhu, Y., Ge, X. Y., Zhang, L. B., Zhang, Y. Z., Bock, C. T. & Shi, Z. L.* (2017). Detection and genome characterization of four novel bat hepadnaviruses and a hepevirus in China. Virol J. 14:40.

14. Liang, J., Yang, X.L., Li, B., Liu, Q., Zhang, Q., Liu, H., Kan, H.P., Wong, K.C., Chek, S.N., He, X., Peng, X., Shi, Z.L., Wu, Y.* & Zhang, L.* (2017). Detection of diverse viruses in alimentary specimens of bats in Macau. Virol Sin. 32(3):226–234.

15. Ge, X.Y., Yang, W.H., Zhou, J.H., Li, B., Zhang, W., Shi, Z.L.* & Zhang, Y.Z.* (2017). Detection of alpha- and betacoronaviruses in rodents from Yunnan, China. Virol J. 14:98.

16. Waruhiu, C., Ommeh, S., Obanda, V., Agwanda, B., Gakuya, F., Ge, X.Y., Yang, X.L., Wu, L.J., Zohaib, A., Hu. B., Shi, Z.L.* (2017). Molecular detection of viruses in Kenyan bats and discovery of novel astroviruses, caliciviruses and rotaviruses. Virol Sin. 32(2):101–114.

17. Tan, B., Yang, X. L., Ge, X. Y., Peng, C., Liu, H. Z., Zhang, Y. Z., Zhang, L. B. & Shi, Z. L.* (2017). Novel bat adenoviruses with low G+C content shed new light on the evolution of adenoviruses. J Gen Virol. 98(4):739–748.

18. Yang, X. L., Zhang, Y. Z., Jiang, R. D., Guo, H., Zhang, W., Li, B., Wang, N., Wang, L., Waruhiu, C., Zhou, J. H., Li, S. Y., Daszak, P., Wang, L. F. & Shi, Z. L.* (2017). Genetically Diverse Filoviruses in Rousettus and Eonycteris spp. Bats, China, 2009 and 2015. Emerg Infect Dis. 23(3):482–486.

19. Tan, B., Wu, L.J., Yang, X.L., Li, B., Zhang, W., Lei, Y.S., Yang, G.X., Chen, J., Chen, G.,Wang, H.Z., Shi, Z. L.*. (2016). Isolation and characterization of adenoviruses infecting endangered golden snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecus roxellana). Virol J. 13:190

20. Zeng, L. P., Gao, Y. T., Ge, X. Y., Zhang, Q., Peng, C., Yang, X. L., Tan, B., Chen, J., Chmura, A. A., Daszak, P. & Shi, Z. L*(2016). Bat Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Like Coronavirus WIV1 Encodes an Extra Accessory Protein, ORFX, Involved in Modulation of the Host Immune Response. J Virol 90 (6), 6573–6582.

21. Tan, B., Yang, X. L., Ge, X. Y., Peng, C., Zhang, Y. Z., Zhang, L. B. & Shi, Z. L*. (2016). Novel bat adenoviruses with an extremely large E3 gene. J Gen Virol., 97, 1625–1635.

22. Ge, X. Y., Yang, W. H., Pan, H., Zhou, J. H., Han, X., Zhu, G. J., Desmond, J. S., Daszak, P., Shi, Z. L*& Zhang, Y. Z*. (2016). Fugong virus, a novel hantavirus harbored by the small oriental vole (Eothenomys eleusis) in China. Virol J., 13, 27.

23. Pan, X., Cao, Z., Yuan, J., Shi, Z., Yuan, X., Lin, L., Xu, Y., Yao, J., Hao, G. & Shen, J. (2016). Isolation and Characterization of a Novel Dicistrovirus Associated with Moralities of the Great Freshwater Prawn, Macrobrachium rosenbergii. Inte J Mol Sci., 17.

24. Yang, X.-L., Hu, B., Wang, B., Wang, M.-N., Zhang, Q., Zhang, W., Wu, L.-J., Ge, X.-Y., Zhang, Y.-Z., Daszak, P., Wang, L.-F. & Shi, Z.-L*.(2016). Isolation and

Characterization of a Novel Bat Coronavirus Closely Related to the Direct Progenitor of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus. J Virol., 90, 3253–3256.

25. Wang, M. N., Zhang, W., Gao, Y. T., Hu, B., Ge, X. Y., Yang, X. L., Zhang, Y. Z. & Shi, Z. L*(2016). Longitudinal surveillance of SARS-like coronaviruses in bats by quantitative real-time PCR. Virol Sin., 31, 78–80.

26. Ge, X. Y., Wang, N., Zhang, W., Hu, B., Li, B., Zhang, Y. Z., Zhou, J. H., Luo, C. M., Yang, X. L., Wu, L. J., Wang, B., Zhang, Y., Li, Z. X. & Shi, Z. L*(2016). Coexistence of multiple coronaviruses in several bat colonies in an abandoned mineshaft. Virol Sin., 31, 31–40.

27. Hu, B., Ge X., Wang, L. F., Shi, Z*(2015). Bat origin of human coronaviruses. Virol J., 12(1): 221.

28. Liang, Y. Z., Wu, L. J., Zhang, Q., Zhou, P., Wang, M. N, Yang, X. L, Ge, X. Y, Wang, L. F, Shi, Z. L*. (2015). Cloning, expression, and antiviral activity of interferon beta from the Chinese microbat, Myotis davidii. Virol Sin., 30(6):425–432.

29. Yang, X. L., Tan, B., Wang, B., Li, W., Wang, N., Luo, C. M., Wang, M. N., Zhang, W., Li, B., Peng, C., Ge, X. Y., Zhang, L. B.,Shi, Z*.(2015). Isolation and identification of bat viruses closely related to human, porcine, and mink orthoreoviruses. J Gen Virol. 96(12):3525–3531.

30. Wang MN, Ge XY, Wu YQ, Yang XL, Tan B, Zhang YJ,Shi ZL*. 2015. Genetic diversity and temporal dynamics of phytoplankton viruses in East Lake, china. Virol Sin, 30: 290–300.

31. Wang Y, Sun Y, Wu A, Xu S, Pan R, Zeng C, Jin X, Ge X, Shi Z, Ahola T, Chen Y, Guo D*. 2015. Coronavirus nsp10/nsp16 methyltransferase can be targeted by nsp10-derived peptide in vitro and in vivo to reduce replication and pathogenesis. J Virol, 89: 8416–8427.

32. Yang Y, Liu C, Du L, Jiang S, Shi Z, Baric RS, Li F*. 2015. Two mutations were critical for bat-to-human transmission of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. J Virol, 89: 9119–9123.

33. Menachery VD, Yount Jr BL, Debbink K, Agnihothram S, Gralinski LE, Plante JA, Graham RL, Scobey T, Ge X-Y, Donaldson EF, Randell SH, Lanzavecchia A, Marasco WA,Shi Z-L, Baric RS*. 2015. A SARS-like cluster of circulating bat coronaviruses shows potential for human emergence. Nat Med 21:1508–1513.

34. Mazet JK., Wei Q, Zhao GP, Cummings DT, Desmond JS, Rosenthal J,King CH., Cao WC, Chmura AA, Hagan EA, Zhang SY, Xiao XM, Xu JG, Shi Z, Feng F, Liu XP, Pan WQ, Zhu GJ, Zuo LY & Daszak P. (2015). Joint China-US Call for Employing a Transdisciplinary Approach to Emerging Infectious Diseases. EcoHealth, DOI:10.1007/s10393–015–1060–1.

35. Hu, B., Chmura, A. A., Li, J., Zhu, G., Desmond, J. S., Zhang, Y., Zhang, W., Epstein, J. H., Daszak, P. & Shi, Z*.(2014). Detection of diverse novel astroviruses from small mammals in China. J Gen Virol 95, 2442–2449.

36. Ge, X-Y., Li, J-L., Yang, X-L., Chmura, A.A., Zhu, G., Epstein, J.H., Mazet, J.K., Hu, B., Zhang, W., Peng, C., Zhang, Y.J., Luo, C.M., Tan, B., Wang, N., Zhu, Y., Crameri, G., Zhang, S.Y., Wang, L.F., Daszak, P.*, Shi, Z-L*.(2013). Isolation and characterizationof a bat SARS-like coronavirus that uses the ACE2 receptor. Nature, 503(7477):535–538.

37. Zhang, G#., Cowled, C#., Shi, Z#., Huang, Z#., Bishop-Lilly, K. A#., Fang, X., Wynne, J. W., Xiong, Z., Baker, M. L., Zhao, W., Tachedjian, M., Zhu, Y., Zhou, P., Jiang, X., Ng, J., Yang, L., Wu, L., Xiao, J., Feng, Y., Chen, Y., Sun, X., Zhang, Y., Marsh, G. A., Crameri, G., Broder, C. C., Frey, K. G*., Wang, L. F*. & Wang, J*. (2013). Comparative Analysis of Bat Genomes Provides Insight into the Evolution of Flight and Immunity. Science 339 (6118):456–460.

38. Wu, L., Zhou, P., Ge, X., Wang, L. F., Baker, M. L. & Shi, Z*. (2013). Deep RNA sequencing reveals complex transcriptional landscape of a bat adenovirus. J Virol 87, 503–511.

39. Shi, Z. Emerging infectious diseases associated with bat viruses. (2013). Sci China Life Sci. 56: 678–682.

40. Zhou, P., Han, Z., Wang, L. and Shi, Z*. (2013). Identification of Immunogenic Determinants of the Spike Protein of SARS-like Coronavirus. Virol Sin 28, (2):92–96.

41. Xia, H., Wang, M., Ge, X., Wu, Y., Yang, X., Zhang, Y., Li, T. and Shi, Z*. (2013). Study of the Dynamics of Microcystis aeruginosa and its Cyanophage in East Lake using quantitative PCR. Virol Sin 28 (5): 309–311.

42. Ge, X., Wu, Y., Wang, M., Wang, J., Wu, L., Yang, X., Zhang, Y. and Shi, Z*. (2013). Viral Metagenomics Analysis of Planktonic Viruses in East Lake, Wuhan, China. Virol Sin 28 (5): 280–290.

43. Yuan, J., Zhang, Y., Li, J., Zhang, Y., Wang, L. F. & Shi, Z*. (2012). Serological evidence of ebolavirus infection in bats, China. Virology Journal 9, 236.

44. Ge, X., Li, Y., Yang, X., Zhang, H., Zhou, P., Zhang, Y. & Shi, Z*. (2012). Metagenomic analysis of viruses from bat fecal samples reveals many novel viruses in insectivorous bats in China. J Virol 86(8):4620–4630.

45. Yang, X., Zhang, Y., Ge, X., Yuan, J. & Shi, Z*. (2012). A novel totivirus-like virus isolated from bat guano. Arch Virol, 157:1093–1099.

46. Yuan, J., Su, N., Wang, M., Xie, P., Shi, Z. & Li, L. (2012). Down-regulation of heme oxygenase-1 by SVCV infection. Fish & shellfish immunology 32, 301–306.

47. Zhou, P., Li, H., Wang, H., Wang, L. F. & Shi, Z*. (2012). Bat severe acute respiratory syndrome-like coronavirus ORF3b homologues display different interferon antagonist activities. J Gen Virol 93, 275–281.

48. Zhou, P., Cowled, C., Marsh, G. A., Shi, Z., Wang, L. F. and Baker, M. L. (2011). Type III IFN Receptor Expression and Functional Characterisation in the Pteropid Bat, Pteropus alecto. PloS one 6, e25385.

49. Zhou, P., Cowled, C., Todd, S., Crameri, G., Virtue, E. R., Marsh, G. A., Klein, R., Shi, Z., Wang, L. F. and Baker, M. L. (2011). Type III IFNs in pteropid bats: differential expression patterns provide evidence for distinct roles in antiviral immunity. J Immunol 186:3138–3147.

50. Ge, X., Li, J., Peng, C., Wu, L., Yang, X., Wu, Y., Zhang, Y. and Shi, Z*(2011). Genetic diversity of novel circular ssDNA viruses in bats in China. J Gen Virol., 92:2646–2653.

51. Bai, H., Wang, Y., Li, X., Mao, H., Li, Y., Han, S., Shi, Z. and Chen, X. (2011). Isolation and characterization of a novel alphanodavirus. Virol J 8:311.

52. Tan, Y. W., and Shi, Z*. (2011). Genotyping of white spot syndrome virus in Chinese cultured shrimp during 1998–1999. Virol Sin 26:123–130.

53. Xing, Y., and Shi, Z*(2011). Nucleocapsid protein VP15 of White spot syndrome virus colocalizes with the nucleolar proteins nucleolin and fibrillarin. Can J Microbiol., 57:759–764.

54. Yuan, J., Marsh, G., Khetawat, D., Broder, C. C., Wang, L. F. and Shi, Z*. (2011). Mutations in the G-H loop region of ephrin-B2 can enhance Nipah virus binding and infection. J Gen Virol 92:2142–2152.

55. Zhang, Y., Yuan, J., Yang, X., Zhou, J., Yang, W., Peng, C., Zhang, H. L. and Shi, Z*(2011). A novel hantavirus detected in Yunnan red-backed vole (Eothenomys miletus) in China. J Gen Virol 92:1454–1457.

56. Zhou B., Y. Li, J. Belser, M. Pearce, M. Schmolke, A. Subba, Z. Shi, S. Zaki, D. Blau, A. Sastre, T. Tumpey, D. Wentworth*. (2011). NS deletions convert the 2009-H1N1 pandemic virus into a live attenuated vaccine. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses. 5:388–391.

57. Yu, M., Tachedjian, M., Crameri, G., Shi, Z., and Wang, L. F. (2010). Identification of key amino acid residues required for horseshoe bat angiotensin-I converting enzyme 2 to function as a receptor for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus. J Gen Virol 91(Pt 7), 1708–1712.

58. Hou, Y., Peng, C., Yu, M., Li,Y., Han, Z., Wang, L-F., Li, F., Shi, Z.* (2010). Bat Angiotensin Converting Enzyme-2 Displays Different Receptor Activity to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Entry. Arch Virol., 155, (10 ): 1563–1569.

59. Li, Y., Ge X., Hon C. C., Zhang H., Zhou P., Zhang Y., Wang L. F. and Shi Z*. (2010). Prevalence and Genetic Diversity of Adeno-Associated Viruses in Bats, China. J Gen Virol. 91(10): 2601–2609.

60. Zhang Y., Zhang H., Dong X., Yuan J., Zhang H., Yang X., Zhou Peng., Ge X., Li Y., Wang L-F, and Shi Z* (2010). Hantavirus Outbreak Associated with Laboratory Rats in Yunnan, China. Infection, Genetics and Evolution. 10(5): 638–644.

61. Li, Y., Ge X., Zhang H., Zhou P., Zhu Y., Zhang Y., Yuan J., Wang L-F., Shi Z.* (2010). Host Range, Prevalence and Genetic Diversity of Adenoviruses in Bats. J. Virol. 84 (8):3889–3897.

62. Yuan, J., Hon,C. C., Li, Y., Wang, D., Xu, G., Zhang, H., Zhou, P., Poon, L. M., Lam, T. T. Leung, F. C. and Shi, Z*. (2010). Intra-species Diversity of SARS-Like Coronaviruses (CoVs) in Rhinolophus sinicus and Its Implications on the Origin of SARS-CoVs in human. J Gen Virol. 91(4):1058–1062.

63. Liao, M., Cheng, K., Yang, J., Zhao, Y., Shi, Z*. (2010). Assessment of UV-B damage in cyanophage PP. Aquat Microb Ecol 58: 323–328.

64. Shi,Z. (2010) Bat and virus. Protein Cell 2010, 1(2): 109–114

65. Hou, Y., P., Han, Z., Zhou, P., Chen, J. and Shi, Z*(2010). Immunogenicity of the Spike Glycoprotein of Bat SARS-like Coronavirus. Virol Sinica, 25 (1):36–44.

66. Li, H., Zheng, Z., Zhou, P., Zhang, B., Shi, Z., Hu, Q. and Wang, H. (2010). The cysteine protease domain of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus non-structural

protein 2 antagonizes interferon regulatory factor 3 activation. J Gen Virol. 91(12), 2947–2958.

67. Zhou, B., Li, Y., Belser, J. A., Pearce, M. B., Schmolke, M., Subba, A. X., Shi, Z., Zaki, S. R., Blau, D. M., Garcia-Sastre, A., Tumpey, T. M. & Wentworth, D. E. (2010). NS-based live attenuated H1N1 pandemic vaccines protect mice and ferrets. Vaccine 28, 8015–8025.

68. Tang, X. C.‚ Li, G.‚ Vasilakis, N.‚ Zhang, Y.‚ Shi, Z.L‚ Zhong, Y.‚ Wang, L.F.‚ Zhang, S. Y. (2009) Differential stepwise evolution of SARS Coronavirus functional proteins in different host species. BMC Evol Biol 9: 52.

69. Zhou, P., Han, Z., Wang, L.F. and Shi, Z*. (2009) Immunogenicity difference between the SARS coronavirus and the bat SARS-like coronavirus spike (S) proteins. Biochem Biophys Res Commun 387(2), 326–329.

70. Tan, Y., Xing, Y., Zhang, H., Feng, Y., Zhou, Y. and Shi, Z*. (2009) Molecular detection of three shrimp viruses and genetic variation of white spot syndrome virus in Hainan province, China, in 2007. J Fish Dis, 32: 777–784.

71. Yuan, J., Li, Y., Zhang, H., Zhou, P., Ke, Z., Zhang, Y. and Shi, Z*. (2009) Indirect enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay based on the nucleocapsid protein of SARS-like coronaviruses. Virol Sinica 24 (2): 146–151.

72. Li, L., Zhang, H., Zhang C., Shi Z*. (2009) Identification and characterization of nuclear localization signals within the nucleocapsid protein VP15 of White Spot Syndrome Virus. Virol Sinica 24 (1):71–76

73. Wang, J., Zhang, H. and Shi, Z*. (2008) Expression and assembly mechanism of the capsid proteins of a satellite virus (XSV) associated with Macrobrachium rosenbergii nodavirus. Virol Sinica 23 (1):73–77.

74. Tang, Y., Shi, Z*. (2008) Proteomic analyses of the shrimp white spot syndrome virus. Virol Sinica 23 (3):157–166.

75. Bai, B., Hu, Q., Hu, H., Zhou, P., Shi, Z., Meng, J., Huang, Y., Lu, B., Mao, P., Wang, H. (2008) Virus-like particles of SARS-like coronavirus formed by membrane proteins from different origins demonstrate stimulating activity in human dendritic cells. 3(7), e2685.

76. Li,Y., Wang, J., Hickey, A. C., Zhang, Y., Li, Y., Wu, Y., Zhang, H., Yuan, J., Han, Z., McEachern, J., Broder, C. C., Wang, L. F. and Shi, Z*. (2008) Antibodies to Nipah or Nipah-like viruses in bats, China. Emerg Infect Dis 14(12):1974–1976.

77. Wang, J., Wang, L-F. and Shi, Z*. (2008) Construction of a non-infectious SARS coronavirus replicon for application in drug screening and analysis of viral protein function. Biochem Biophys Res Commun 374(1):138–142.

78. Yu, M., Stevens, V., Berry, J. D., Crameri, G., McEachern, J., Tu, C., Shi, Z., Liang, G., Weingart, H., Cardosa, J., Eaton, B. T., Wang, L. F. (2008) Determination and application of immunodominant regions of SARS coronavirus spike and nucleocapsid proteins recognized by sera from different animal species. J Immunol Methods 331(1–2):1–12.

79. Hon, C. C., Lam, T. Y., Shi, Z., Drummond, A. J., Yip, C. W., Zeng, F., Lam, P. Y. and Leung, F. C.. (2008) Evidence of the recombinant origin of a bat severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-like coronavirus and its implications on the direct ancestor of SARS coronavirus. J Virol 82(4): 1819–1826.

80. Ren, W., Qu, X., Li, W., Han, Z., Yu, M., Zhang, S., Wang, L. F., Deng, H., Shi, Z*. (2008) Difference in receptor usage between SARS coronavirus and SARS-like coronavirus of bat origin. J Virol 82(4): 1899–1907.

81. Shi, Z. and Hu, Z. (2008) A review of studies on animal reservoirs of the SARS coronavirus. Virus research 133:74–87.

82. Cheng, K., Zhao, Y., Du, X., Zhang, Y., Lan, S., Shi, Z*. (2007) Solar radiation-driven decay of cyanophage infectivity, and photoreactivation of the cyanophage by host cyanobacteria. Aquatic Microbial Ecology 48(1): 13–18.

83. Cui, J., Han, N., Streicker, D., Li, G.., Tang, X., Shi, Z., Hu, Z., Zhao, G., Fontanet, A., Guan, Y., Wang, L., Jones, G., Field, H. E., Daszak, P. and Zhang, S. (2007) Evolutionary relationships among bat coronaviruses and their hosts. Emerg Infect Dis 13(10):1526–1532.

84. Zhang, C, Yuan, J, Shi, Z*. (2007) Molecular epidemiological investigation of infectious hypodermal and hematopoietic necrosis virus and taura syndrome virus in Penaeus vannamei cultured in China. Virol Sinica 22(5): 380–388.

85. Gu, W., Yuan, J., Xu, G., Li, L., Liu, N., Zhang, C., Zhang, J. and Shi, Z*. (2007) Production and characterization of monoclonal antibody of shrimp white syndrome virus envelope protein VP28. Virol Sinica 22(1): 21–25.

86. Wang, L. F., Shi, Z., Zhang, S., Field, H., Daszak, P. and Eaton B. T. (2006) A review of bats and SARS: virus origin and genetic diversity. Emerg Infect Dis 12(12): 1834–1840.

87. Ren, W., Li, W., Yu, M., Hao, P., Zhang, Y., Zhou, P., Zhang, S., Zhao, G., Zhong, Y., Wang, S., Wang, L. F. and Shi, Z*. (2006) Full genome sequences of two SARS-like coronaviruses in horseshoe bats and genetic variation analysis. J Gen Virol 87(11): 3355–3359.

88. Zhang, H., Wang, J., Yuan, J., Li, L., Zhang, J., Bonami, J. R. and Shi, Z*. (2006) Quantitative relationship of two viruses (MrNV and XSV) in white tail disease of Macrobrachium rosenbergii de Man. Dis Aquat Org 71(1): 11–17.

89. Li, L., Yuan, J., Cai, C., Gu, W. and Shi, Z*. Multiple envelope proteins are involved in white spot syndrome virus (WSSV) infection in crayfish. Arch Virol, 2006, 151(7): 1309–1317.

90. Li, W., Shi Z*., Yu M., Ren W., Smith C., Epstein H. J., Wang H., Crameri G., Hu Z., Zhang H., Zhang J., Mceachern J., Field H., Daszak P., Eaton T.B., Zhang S*., and Wang L. F*. (2005) Bats are natural reservoirs of SARS-like coronaviruses. Science 310(5748): 676–679.

91. Huang, R., Xie, Y., Zhang, J. and Shi, Z*. (2005) A novel envelope protein involved in white spot syndrome virus infection. J Gen Virol 86 (5): 1357–1361.

92. Shi, Z., Wang, H., Zhang, J., Xie, Y., Li, L., Chen, X., Edgerton, B. F. and Bonami, J. R. (2005) Response of crayfish, Procambarus clarkii, haemocytes infected by white spot syndrome virus. J Fish Dis 28(3): 151–156.

93. Bonami, J. R, Shi, Z., Qian, D. and Sri Widada, J. (2005) White tail disease of the giant freshwater prawn, Macrobrachium rosenbergii: separation of the associated virions and characterization of MrNV as a new type of nodavirus. J Fish Dis 28(1): 23–31.

94. Zhang, S., Shi, Z. and Bonami, J. R. (2004) Purification, characterization and morphology of a freshwater crab reovirus. J Fish Dis 27(12): 687–692.

95. Sri Widada, J., Richard, V., Shi, Z., Qian, D. and Bonami, J. R. (2004) Dot-blot hybridization and RT-PCR detection of extra small virus (XSV) associated with white tail disease of prawn Macrobrachium rosenbergii. Dis Aquat Org 58(1): 83–87.

96. Sri Widada, J., Durand, S., Cambournac, I., Qian, D., Shi, Z., Dejonghe, E., Richard, V. and Bonami J. R. (2003) Genome-based detection methods of Macrobrachium rosenbergii nodavirus, a pathogen of the giant freshwater prawn, Macrobrachium rosenbergii dot-blot, in situ hybridization and RT-PCR. J Fish Dis 26(10): 583–590.

97. Shi, Z., Qian, D., Zhang, J., Cao, Z. and Bonami, J. R. (2004) Isolation, purification and nucleic acid characterization of two viral particles from freshwater prawn Macrobrachium rosenbergii. Chin J Virol 20 (1): 58–61. (English abstract).

98. Shi, Z., Xie, Y., Tang, X., Sri Widada, J. and Bonami J.R. (2004) Nucleic acid detection and partial sequence analysis of Macrobrachium rosenbergii nodavirus. Chin J Virol 20 (1): 62–66. (English abstract).

99. Qian, D#., Shi, Z#., Zhang, S., Li, L., Xie, Y. and Bonami, J. R. (2003) Extra small particles (XSP) and nodavirus associated with whitish muscle disease in the giant fresh water prawn Macrobrachium rosenbergii. J Fish Dis, 26 (9): 521–527.

100.Zhang, S., Bonami, Jean-Robert, Shi, Z*. (2003) cDNA library construction of a Chinese mitten crab reovirus RNA1 and partial sequence analysis of its RNA polymerase gene. Virol Sinica 18(1): 72–75. (English abstract).

101.Wang, C., Guo, Y., Cheng, K., Zhao, Y. and Shi, Z*. (2003) The correlation of host’s growth stage with enlargement of plaque and absorption rate of cyanophage. Acta Hydrobiol Sinica 27(6): 660–663. (English abstract).

102.Luo, W., Ju, C., Cheng, K., Zhao, Y. and Shi, Z*. (2003) A backflushing ultrafiltration technique for concentrating cyanophage. Virol Sinica 18(4): 397–400. (English abstract).

103.Xie, Y., Huang, R. and Shi Z*. (2003) Sequence analysis, cloning and expression of a putative cytokine receptor gene of white spot syndrome virus. Virol Sinica, 18(4): 362–366. (English abstract).

104.Xie Y., Zhang S., Huang R. and Shi Z*. (2003) A modified technique for purifying white spot syndrome virus. Virol Sinica 18(4): 391–393. (English abstract).

105.Guo, Y., Cheng, K., Zhao, Y., Wang, J., Wang, C., Shi, Z. and Liu, Y. (2003) The distribution and infectivity of cyanophage and other algae-lysin factor in fresh water. China Environ Science 23(2): 167–170. (English abstract).

106.Cheng, K., Wang, C., Guo, Y., Shi, Z. and Zhao, Y. (2002) Measurement of lysing cycle and burst size of cyanophage infecting filamentous cyanobacteria (blue-green algae). Virol Sinica 17(4): 374–376. (English abstract).

107.Shi, Z. and Zhu, H. (2002) Aquatic crustacean viruses — Bacilliform viruses. Virol Sinica 17(3): 282–288. (English abstract).

108.Zhang, S., Zhang, J., Huang, C., Bonami, J.R. and Shi Z. (2002) Preliminary studies on two types of reo-like viruses from crab Eriocheir sinensis. Virol Sinica 17(3): 264–267. (English abstract).

109.Zhu H., Shi, Z. and Zhao, Y. (2002) Analysis of one gene from white spot syndrome virus of shrimp. Acta Hydrobiol Sinica 26(5): 560–563. (English abstract).

110.Corbel, V., Zuprizal, Shi, Z., Huang, C, Arcier, J.M and Bonami, J.R. (2001) Experimental infection of European crustaceans with white spot syndrome virus (WSSV). J Fish Dis 224: 377–382.

111.Huang, C., Shi, Z., Zhang, L., Xie, Y., Zhang, L., Chen, D. and Wu, Q. (2001). Homology comparison of white spot syndrome baculovirus (WSSV) from Penaeid shrimp. Virol Sinica 16: 81–84. (English abstract).

112.Shi, Z., Huang C., Zhang J., Chen D. and Bonami J.R. (2000). White spot syndrome virus (WSSV) experimental infection of the freshwater crayfish Cherax quadricarinatus. J. Fish Dis 23: 285–288.

113.Shi, Z., Durand S. and Bonami J.R. (2000). Screening of DNA polymerase gene from white spot syndrome virus (WSSV) by using degenerated oligonucleotides. Virol Sinica 15: 302–307. (English abstract).

114.Shi, Z., Huang, C., Chen, D., Durand, S. and Bonami J.R. (1998). Partial cloning of the genome of non-occluded baculovirus from Penaeus chinensis and preparing the probe for detection. Virol Sinica 13: 263–267. (English abstract).

115.Huang, C., Shi, Z. Zhang, L., Xie, L., Zhang, L., Chen, D. and Wu, Q. (2000). Study of white spot syndrome baculovirus infection process in Penaeus monodon by in situ Hybridization. Chin J Virol 16: 242–246. (English abstract).

116.Zhao, Y., Shi, Z., Huang, G. and Wang, X. (1999). Blue green algae viruses (cynoaphages). Virol Sinica, 14(2):100–105. (English abstract).

117.Huang, C., Shi, Z. Zhang, J., Zhang, L., Chen, D. and Bonami, J. R. (1999). Establishment of a model for proliferating white spot syndrome virus in vivo. Virol Sinica 14: 358–363. (English abstract).

118.Huang, C., Shi, Z., Zhang, L., Wang, B. and Li, H. (1997) Cytopathic changes of Penaeus chinensis infected by two kinds of viruses and immunogold labelling. Virol Sinica 12: 171–177. (English abstract).

119.Huang, C., Zhang, J., Gao, W. and Shi, Z. (1997) Observation and analysis of histo-and cyto-pathological changes of diseased shrimp with light and electron Microscopy. Virol Sinica 12 (4): 364–370. (English abstract).

120.Zhao, Y. and Shi, Z. (1996). Virus and virus-like particles of eukaryotic algae. Virol Sinica 11(2): 93–102. (English abstract).

121.Shi, Z., Xiao, L. and Chen, D. (1996). Immulogical detection of two shrimp viruses. Virol Sinica 11: 365–368. (English abstract).

122.Shi, Z., Xiao, L., Gao, W. Zhang, L. and Chen d. (1996). Immunological detection of two kinds of viruses from Penaeus chinensis. Virol Sinica 11(4): 368–371. (English abstract).

123.Xiao, L., Shi, Z., Gao, W., Zhang, L., Chen, D. (1995) Isolation, purification of Penaeus chinensis parvovirus and analysis of its nucleic acid and protein. Virol Sinica 10: 356–361. (English abstract).

124.Li, Y., Shi, Z. and Chen, D. (1994). A Study on some biochemical characteristics of Nuclear Polyhedrosis virus of Ectropis grisescens Warren. Virol Sinica 9(3): 266–271. (English abstract).

125.Shi, Z. Zhang, L. and Chen, D. (1992) Immunity studies on the Euproctis pseudoconspersa nuclear polyhedrosis virus. Virol Sinica 7(3): 276–282. (English abstract).

Appendix B: Professor Zhengli Shi’s Conference Presentations

Shi, Z. (2018) From SARS to SADS: predict of emerging infectious diseases. US-China Workshop on Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases. University of California, Berkeley, June 27–29, 2018.

Shi, Z. (2018) Risk assessment of bat coronavirus spillover and prevention strategy. Sino-Germany symposium “Globalization-Challenge and Response for Infectious Diseases” September 5, 2018, Hamburg, Germany.

Shi, Z. (2018) Coronaviruses associated with human and animal diseases in China-From SARS to SADS. U.S. China Dialogue on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety and Global Health Security. January 17, 2018, Galveston, USA.

Shi, Z. (2017) SARS coronavirus may have originated from frequent recombination events between SARS-related coronaviruses in a single horseshoe bat habitat. Cell Symposia: Emerging and Re-emerging Viruses 2017. October 1–3, Arlington, USA.

Shi, Z. (2017) Genetic evolution and interspecies infection of bat SARS-like coronavirus. International Advisory Board Meeting and Coronavirus Mini-Symposium for the Theme-based Research Scheme Project on MERS Coronavirus. September 11–12, Hong Kong.

Shi, Z. (2017) SARS coronavirus may have originated from frequent recombination events between SARS-related coronaviruses in a single horseshoe bat habitat. 27th Annual Meeting of the Society for Virology (Germany). March 22–25, 2017, Marburg, Germany.

Shi, Z. (2016) Prevalence, animal origins and diagnosis of MERS-CoV. Devising Strategies to Control Emerging Viral Hemorrhagic Fever in Pakistan. November 14–16, 2016, Lahore, Pakistan.

Shi, Z. (2015) Emerging viral zoonosis in China. Annual meeting of Sino-Germany Society for Medicine. October 2–3, Berlin, Germany.

Shi, Z. (2015) Bat coronaviruses associated with human diseases. CAS-NAS Workshop on the Challenges of Emerging Infections, Laboratory Safety, and Global Health Security. September 29–30, Beijing, China.

Shi, Z. (2015) The animal origin of SARS coronavirus; from genome to receptor usage. Annual meeting of Hubei Society for Microbilogy. August 22–23, Enshi, China.

Shi. Z. (2015) New evidence in support of bat origin of SARS coronavirus. In “workshop on Coronavirus and Arterivirus, Special lecture”, ASV2015, July 5–12, London, Canada.

Shi, Z. (2015) The animal origin of SARS coronavirus; from genome to receptor usage. The 3rd annual “host pathogen interaction in biodefense and emerging infectious diseases” conference. Feb. 12, Manassas, Virginia.

Shi, Z et al. (2014) Isolation and identification of bat mammalian orthoreovirus from Chinese bats. The 6th International Symposium on Emerging Viral Diseases. October 29–30, Wuhan, China.

Shi, Z, et al., (2013) New evidence further supports bats as natural reservoirs of SARS coronavirus. The 5th Wuhan International Symposium on Modern Virology. Oct. 30–31, Wuhan, China.

Shi, Z. (2013) Bat borne viruses. CSIRO-CAS Biosecurity Workshop. 13–15 June 2013, Cairns, Australia.

Shi, Z.(2012) Bat viruses detected in China, 31th annual ASV meeting. Jul 21–25, Madison, USA.

Shi, Z.(2011) Virome in Bat Intestinal Tract, Implication of Important Roles Played by Bats in Ecosystem, XVIth International Union of Microbiological Societies 2. Sep 12–16, Sapporo, Japan.

Shi, Z. (2010) Novel hantavirus detected in Yunnan Red-backed Vole, Eothenomys miletus. Infectious Disease Genomics and Global Health. Sep 11–15, Hinxton, UK.

Shi, Z. (2008) Antibodies to Nipah or Nipah-like viruses among bats in mainland China. The 3rd International Symposium on Emerging Viral Diseases. Oct. 26–28, Wuhan, China.

Shi Z. (2008) Genetic Evolution of SARS coronavirus. The 179th forum of Young Scientists of China Association of Science and Technology. Nov 1–2, Lijiang, China.

Shi, Z, et al. (2008) The angiotension converting enzymes-2 of bats display different susceptibility to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus. Annual meeting of Hubei Society for Microbiology. June 26–29, Hohhot, China.

Shi, Z. (2007) Macrobrachium rosenbergii nodavirus (MrNV) and its associated satellite virus. Aquaculture 2007, Feb. 28- Mar. 2, San Antonio, USA.

Shi, Z. (2007) Functional analysis of structural envelope proteins of white spot syndrome virus (WSSV) and prevalence of WSSV and other shrimp viruses in china — a review. Aquaculture 2007, Feb. 28- Mar. 2, San Antonio, USA.

Shi, Z. (2007) Evolution on SARS Coronavirus. The First Mexico-China Scientific Cooperation Conference. Aug. 27–29, Mexico City, Mexico.

Shi, Z. (2006) Bats are natural reservoirs of SARS-like coronaviruses. France- China Medical Symposium. Oct. 23–24, Paris, France.

Shi, Z. et al. (2006) Genetic diversity of bat SARS-like coronavirus and its interaction with ACE2. The 8th Session of the International Congress « Molecular Epidemiology and Evolutionary Genetics of Infectious Diseases » (MEEGID VIII). Nov. 30 — Dec. 2, Bangkok, Thailand.

Shi Z. (2006) Biology and molecular genetics of white spot syndrome virus. Society for Invertebrate Pathology 39th Annual Meeting. Aug. 27 to Sept. 1, Wuhan, China.

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